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I. INTRODUCTION

Law is representation and relationships, customs, opinions, beliefs, and
rules. The perceptions and beliefs as well as the acceptance of each man
and each woman impact the degree of their willingness to commit to and
obey the laws - be it the speed limit, use of illegal and/or misuse of legal
drugs, insider trading, or advocacy of overthrow or rebellion, to name just
a few.
Rules, agreements, obligations, formal or otherwise, in a democracy
facilitate order and expectations, and make it possible to live together in an
organized, predictable, peaceful, and secure fashion.' International
agreements establish procedures and rules intended to provide peace,
security, and well-being to individuals, groups, and cross-border
transnational governmental exchanges. 2
Terrorists intend to disrupt the peace and security of nation states
through premeditated politically motivated violence? Among the

1. See generally RICHARD D. SCHWARTZ, SOCIETY AND THE LEGAL ORDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome Skolnick eds., 1970); see
also JACQUES ELLUL, THE POLITICAL ILLUSION (Konrad Kellen trans., 1972).
2. See generally MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967).
3. See generally EUGENE VICTOR WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE, A STUDY OF
POLmCAL VIOLENCE(1969); see also PETER BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC., INSIDETHE SECRET WORLD
OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (2001).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/8
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consequences of the attack upon the World Trade Center was the creation
of widespread personal fear and panic, as well as the disruption of the
global economy. 4 The terrorists attempted to create a state of anarchy.' The

U.N. Security Council concluded that the attacks threatened international
security perhaps by influencing or affecting the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion.' Humanitarian intervention to prevent not only

terrorists acts, but also genocide, famine or otherwise, should be a priority
of the United Nations and every member state capable of assuming
responsibility for economic transnational rehabilitation.
The only point here is that one must recognize that law is a necessary

and important component of social control. Law is a critical, though not the
only, instrument of social control. The concept of social control implies the
notion of governance.' Terrorists intend their results to accomplish the
opposite. One cannot predict with any degree of certainty the type or time

of the consequences of terrorist attacks. As the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1368 noted, a nation state has the legitimate right of selfdefense against such attacks.'

Governance implies policy, which in turn implies choice and decisions,
expectations, and opportunity; it excludes terrorism and anarchy.' To have
input in the development and revision of the rules, knowledge of the rules
and expectations and the opportunity to make one's opinion heard are
major factors in a democratic sense of self-control. Further, these
expectations and opportunities are, within this citizen's frame of influence,
translated into constitutional rule.' 0

I suspect traditional societies had a different focus, although similar
aspirations. Their governors possessed single control with a list of

"shoulds" for those being controlled. "Rights" were an entity belonging to

&

4. See, e.g., How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR (James F. Hoge, Jr.
Gideon Rose eds., 2001); see generally ROLAND JACQUARD, IN THE NAME OF OSAMA BIN LADEN,

GLOBAL TERRORISM AND THE BIN LADEN BROTHERHOOD (Samia Serageldin ed., George Holoch
trans., 2002).
5. ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR (2002); see also
JEAN-CHARLES BRISARD & GUILLAUME DASQUIE, FORBIDDEN TRUTH: U.S.-TALIBAN SECRET OIL
DIPLOMACY AND THE FAILED HUNT FOR BIN LADEN (Lucy Rounds et al. trans., 2002).

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
See generally ROSCOE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING To LAW (1951).
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
See S. Res. 22, 107th Cong. (2001); see MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 3-77.
See generally LON F. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
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the governors; the common run of humankind had limited access to those

"rights.""'
The sense of constitution, as it developed, provided nature, functions,
and limitations upon the government, as well as articulating rights and

liberties of the citizenry. A constitution also facilitates control, security,
direction, and development. A constitution, in theory, assures change from
within. When the change comes from without, the legitimate constitutional
government has a right to self-defense.

II. THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW
Within this emerging concept of law, there were also certain moral and
social standards that began to take hold. Certain acts became taboo and
were decried by the society as beyond toleration. The reason was that in
order for a society to survive it has a right and duty to implement and
enforce rights and responsibilities through its institutions."
What, in part, separates societies is the differing views of the very
purpose of society. In the West, the goal of society was to maximize
individual freedoms consistent with the integrity of that society." For
example, Lord Patrick Devlin argued that a society has a right to protect its
own existence provided it is following given moral convictions and is
attempting, in its defense, to protect its social, economic, and legal
environment.1 4 To concede Devlin's point, which assuredly differs
considerably from John Stuart Mill," one must go a step further. For
surely, Lord Devlin did not mean to suggest that public condemnation
alone was sufficient to justify making an act a crime.
The late Lon Fuller agreed that there are moral principles and moral
standards which a society has every right to place beyond toleration, and
society has a right to impose sanctions upon those who dissent.1 6 Child
pornography immediately comes to mind. However, he notes that the
majority rule in a democratic society is also a moral conviction stripped of
emotional reaction (prejudice). How does a society know when a threat is
directed toward the very existence of that society? When is there sufficient

11.

See generally MAX GLUCKMAN, PoLmcS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965);

see also Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Western Constitutionalism and African Nationbuilding: The
Anglophonic East African Experience, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (1975).
12. Baldwin, supranote 11, at 373.

13.

See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).

14. id. at 86-101.
15. Id. at 124-39.
16. FULLER, supra note 10.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/8
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clear and present danger to justify societal reaction? Many who are drawn
to terrorists encampments reject as myths the functions of a democratic
society:
a) Decisions must be made in the public interest;

b) Decisions must be made objectively on the basis of shared values
and shared facts; and
c) Decisions of government must be fair.'7
If the democratic philosophy is an illusion, is that sufficient for the
disillusioned to rise against the society? Or must an active response require
additional evidence of clear, illicit governmental action, such as former
segregation laws in the southern United States?'" The question becomes:
How does one go about the process of social change? Are there
constitutionally recognized means available to the dissenter?
Democracy is a good and proper instrumentality to serve people. The
problem has been that although democracies deal with popular control of
power sharing, who deals with popular control of social change? Have our
institutions been successful in changing the rules to meet rapid social and
economic change? Does society stop institutions or restructure them?
Fuller argued that by asking the questions the answers become clearer. He
notes that there are eight conditions that exist in order for a society to claim
its existence based upon a rule of law. If the eight are met, neither
terrorism nor anarchy are an option.'9
1. Laws are to be generalized as rules.
2 Laws are to be made known.
3. Laws are to impose liability for acts prospectively and not
retroactively.
4. Laws should be sufficiently clear to serve as standards for decisions
made in their name.
5. Laws are to avoid practical contradictions.
6. Laws ought not require what is impossible.
7. Laws are to be sufficiently constant to enable reliance on them.
8. Laws are to be implemented according to their terms. 20
What instrument confers the authority defined by Fuller? Do the eight
principles provide a way of arguing against any particular condition?
In Dr. Bonham's case Lord Coke said:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly

17. Id. at 159-67.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 100-06.
20. See generally LON F. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
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void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason,
or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void. 2

In the United States, the constitutional framers understood Lord Coke
to mean the doctrine of judicial review. There must be an institution
established that determines j ustification for the proposal of other principles
and for the identification of fundamental conditions; that institution is

found in Article

111.22

In an unpublished paper co-authored by this writer and Winston Nagan,
we argued that the constitutional rule is a critical component to the wellbeing of any society.2 3 If anarchy is to be avoided or neutralized, Myres
McDougal concluded that the focus must be upon the constitutive
process.2 4 Only then can it be said that those who arm and physically attack
a functioning system of constitutional well-being are by all accounts,
terrorists.
Therefore, we suggested that a constitutive process must be an
identifiable transparent process of the kinds of social and political
decisions that continuously, and over time, establish and maintain the
larger processes of law and governance. We borrowed heavily from our
former professor, the late Myres McDougal, and his works on authoritative
decision making. For McDougal, the constitutive processes serve to
identify and characterize legitimate authoritative decision-makers; they,
guided by the communities' rules of law, articulate and seek to specify the
basic values and policies of the community. The decision makers establish
the basic structures of authority, serve to allocate power for effective
sanctions, authorize procedures appropriate to diverse structures of
authority and institutional frames, and secure a process where by a myriad
of decisions regarding public and civic order are made for the effective
process of lawmaking (prescription) and law-enforcing (application).

21. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 1136, 118a, 77 ENG. REP. 652 (1610).
22. See EDWIN CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 34-40 (1948).

23. F. Baldwin & W. Nagan, Constitutional Imperatives (1988) (paper delivered to the
Nairobi Roundtable on Constitutional Governance in Nairobi, Kenya).
24. MYERS MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960);
MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 35-118.
I submit that the body of laws Ihave been discussing is essentially a branch of constitutional
law, largely and properly developing outside the framework of our written constitution. It
is constitutional law in that it involves the allocation among the various institutions of our
society of legal power, that is, the authority to enact rules and to reach decisions that will be
regarded as properly binding on those affected by them.

FULLER, supra note 10, at 128.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/8
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Neither terrorism nor anarchy have a place within a society implementing
the process of authoritative decision.
An empirical conception of constitutive process may, then, be
reformulated for policy-process purposes by the use of a phase analysis.
Such an analysis would systematically describe, for example, who the
relevant participants in the constitutive process are; what their perspectives
of identification, demand and expectation are; what resources (bases of
power) are at their disposal; what strategies of action or intervention are at
their disposal (coercive-persuasive); in what situational contexts do they

operate -

organized (formal), unorganized (informal); and with what

results and what effects. It can be demonstrated that for policy-process
purposes a phase analysis may be a useful tool to comprehensively and
systematically describe either social process in general or selected
outcomes of social process in particular. Included within selective
outcomes is the right to legitimate self-defense, which include intended as
well as, at times, unintended consequences. Indeed, the level of both
generality and particularity characteristic of governance, law and human
rights claims necessitates a methodological tool that permits self-defense.
The constitutive process notion is an outcome of social process and more
precisely, the power process implicit in the right of legitimate national
survival.

III. THE SOCIAL PROCESS CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Those working in a process-policy frame of reference have sought
criteria that can be employed to isolate key facts in the social process that
separate those who aspire to power through bloodshed from those who
respect and implement law, human rights, and policy. McDougal proposed
a general model for these purposes. The model invokes human beings
pursuing values through institutions based upon resources. The model
employed is a contextual guide for those implementing self-defense
legislation which must factor in both a comprehensive and a selective
understanding of the context of social process problems, decisional
responses thereto, and consequences or impacts on social process of
governmental decisional interventions."

25. See MCDOUGAL ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 3-34.
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IV. THE PROCESS OF EFFECTIVE POWER: A NECESSARY PREDICATE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The problem of degree of use of power in society is one of the most

important questions encountered by those concerned with the rule of law
and human rights. The relationship of law to power is also one of the most
important questions anyone developing protection policy might encounter.
The full appreciation of this relationship requires not only an operational
understanding of what the law is, but also an understanding of the nature
of the power available to a given society and the impact upon global
environments should the society elect to implement power to the
maximum. The traditional approach that emerges from the social and
political literature about the idea of power focuses upon basically three
distinct theories that explain the nature of power. 26
The first is a theory of elites. To understand the power dynamics of any
society, one must identify the group that constitutes itself as the operative
elite. It is the power elite that fundamentally determines the ideology, the
morality, the law, and the significant social dynamics of the society.27
The second theory suggests that power in society is expressed in terms
of the pattern of social stratification. The pattern of social stratification is
fundamentally determined by economic factors; hence, the critical concept
that defines power is the notion of class." In the orthodox Marxian theory,
the dominant class is the class that controls the means of production.
Ideology, morality, and law simply reflect interests of the dominant class.

The third major modern theory of power in society is, we submit, the
most reasonable for dynamic societies. Within any dynamic society, there
are usually myriad group alignments. These alignments are often reflected
in political interest groups representing general and special interests within
the society. These groups may be composed of ethnic alignments,
economic alignments, skill group alignments, and so forth. In a pluralistic
context, no one group ever controls the allocation of all the desired goods
and services of a society. Complex adjustments, bargains, and negotiations
are made between groups in a complex pattern of cooperation and conflict.
In this sense, power is highly diffused and control is often a function of the
principle of give and take. In such a system, the role of law in the
maintenance of the pluralistic scheme is an extremely complex one: The
role of law and lawyers are crucial to the success of pluralist-legal nexus

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss1/8
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provided there are adequate theoreticians. 29 This model, though best
reflecting the United States and most other constitutional democracies,
nevertheless has elements of the first two as well.
This last model is consistent with a focus of government that, in part,
encourages movement towards equilibrium which requires collaboration
in pursuit of common interests. Some could criticize the model's
implementation because it appears to be resistant to radical change.
However, this ignores the fact that the model insists upon participatory
democracy in order to function properly.30
Efforts to integrate conflict and consensus paradigms of social process
are rooted in the intuitive insight that in all human interaction, one can

discover patterns of both collaboration and conflict. The trick is to discover
when people will collaborate and when they will fight. In other words, the
control and regulation of collaboration and conflict in the common interest
poses a significant problem for the law and for the conceptions of law
within a society. If we accept the ideal that law is a major - indeed a
massive - instrument of social control, then, the relationship of law to the
process of effective power is an entirely relevant datum. If the formal
foundations of the process of effective power are reflected in constitutive
arrangements, the relevance of power to constitutionalism would seem to
be apparent.
We suggest, in this Article, that in its most basic sense, a national
constitution is not a document fed by precedents about its scope and
relevance. In its most fundamental sense, a national constitution is in
reality a process concerned with the allocation of decisional competence
regarding the implementation of the institutions of power, as well as
implementation of deployment of self-preservation defenses.
These understandings have been codified in our most basic document,
the U.S. Constitution. What is conventionally called constitutional law is,
in reality, the decision process undertaken by societies which contain
conflict between different power groups and alignments. Conflict control

must, then, be considered amajor purpose for any constitutive scheme. The
impetus to limit the cost and scope of a conflict through constitutional
containment is also well established in the doctrine of separation of

powers.31 Both the conflict and collaboration power paradigms are intrinsic
to any constitutive process, as well as the central features of the conditions
that sustain such processes.

29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
31. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596-601 (2002).
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For anyone concerned with governance, there is the problem of the
application of generalized values - such as community policies or human
rights - to concrete problems. What principles of procedure and content
can be devised to guide decision-making, especially in the arena of human
rights as applied to concrete, particular problems, in a way that enhances
the process of both governance and human rights? With these conditions
in place, if the society becomes the target of terrorists or anarchists, the
right to self-defense becomes a constitutional imperative."

V. A NATION HAS A RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF
The initial response to the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001
came from the international community on two levels: (1)military; and (2)
U.N. resolutions calling for the implementation of domestic legislative

anti-terror programs. The United States responded in kind and legislators,
speaking to the self-defense issue, came forth with the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism," euphemistically known as the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001. The Act is in direct response to terrorism
worldwide and to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373. The Patriot Act
followed Congressional authorization of September 14, 2001 granting
broad powers to the executive to seek out and destroy terrorists. The Act
is, in part, 1) intended to complement and support the military campaigns
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and 2) to allocate to law enforcement and
financial regulators more realistic weapons and user-friendly laws to fight
terrorists and terrorist funding. The two goals, especially the second,
required a complex redesign of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, and its
subsequent amendments did just that.34 The Act defines terrorism and

focuses upon enhancing domestic security by implementing legislation
involving, among other things, computer privacy, electronic surveillance,
warrants to trap and trace, no-knock searches, and extraterritorial search
warrants. The Act also implicates matters involving immigration and
borders, including bulk cash smuggling. More importantly, in Title III,

32. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37,39 (1800); Franklin Lor, LegalAnalysis ofUS. Military
Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1-2 (1985).
33. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also
Bruce Zagaris, United States Enacts Counter-TerrorismAct with Significant New International
Provisions, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 522 (2001).
34. Allison L.C. de Cerreno, Sec. 208 of the PatriotAct Walking a Fine Line Between
Security and Free Exchange of Scientists andKnowledge, available at http://members.nyas.org/
events/policy/pol_01_1023.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2003); see USA PATRIOT Act § 358.
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there are over forty complex new banking and other money transmitting
regulations impacting extraterritoriality, offshore correspondent banking,
underground banking, new predicate crimes complementing the crime of
money laundering, and agency information sharing.3"
Much of the focus of the Act is international money laundering and
anti-terrorism financing. This focus derives from the extreme danger the
modern terrorist poses to infrastructure, national defense, and the
international economic system.
Title III of the Act, as well as the subsequent rules promulgated
thereunder by the Treasury Department, impact upon the illicit money
trails, foreign bank correspondent accounts, foreign person private banking
accounts, and identification and verification of all customers seeking to do
business at a U.S. financial institution (a daunting task indeed!). Savings
associations, credit unions, casinos, and others similarly situated are also
subject to regulation under the Act. In brief, Title III grants to the Secretary
of the Treasury extensive powers to impose special measures against any
foreign financial institution, regardless of jurisdictional considerations.
The Act permits forfeiture of proceeds even if the crime took place on
foreign soil as long as the proceeds from the illicit act were transferred to
or invested in the United States. The specific crimes include any crime of
violence, bribing of a public official, embezzlement of public funds,
munitions smuggling, or any offense which, if committed in the United
States, would subject the perpetrator to extradition or criminal prosecution.
Of significant importance, Title III permits in rem forfeiture of funds where
illicit funds are transferred from a correspondent bank account to an
interbank account and the illicit funds account is traceable to funds
originally deposited in a foreign bank or other financial institution holding
the account. Under the Act, the foreign bank from which the funds are
forfeited has no standing in a U.S. court to contest the forfeiture. Only the
owner of the funds account in the foreign bank has standing. Significant
problems and conflicts may develop within the foreign bank's home
jurisdiction if there is a mandated duty to pay depositors. In Title III, the

35. Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giantin the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring
DomesticApparatus of UnprecedentedScope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4; see, e.g., United

States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 116 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2000) (regarding the impact of Title
III and resulting impact of section 317 of the Patriot Act); see Bruce Zagaris, United States
Appellate Court DisallowsUnited StatesJurisdictionOver Offshore Bank, 18 INT'LENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 103, 105 (Mar. 2002). The difficulty in implementation is only now being addressed
publicly. See, e.g., A Report to Congress in Accordance with § 326 (b) of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Submitted to Congress by the Department of the Treasury, Oct. 21, 2002.
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U.S. Congress is also attempting for the first time to regulate the
underground banking systems such as hawala and hundi. 36
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the Patriot Act into law."
With the apparent lack of political will that existed prior to September 11,
2001 no longer an obstacle, federal law enforcement has moved quickly to
begin the implementation of the Act. The goal was, and is, to penetrate the
heart of the terrorist organizational machine, or as author Peter L. Bergen
termed it: Holy War, Inc." The goals of the Act implicate and require
international cooperation, redesignation of internal laws, and enhanced
cross-border cooperation. Without international cooperation, the Act will
lose most of its intended impact.

VI.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

To achieve their goals, terrorist and organized crime operations require
support internationally and otherwise. 39 User-friendly states, citizens, and
institutions are a necessity. Banks citing bank secrecy, nations citing
sovereignty concerns, and elected public officials citing freedom from
governmental financial controls intentionally or unintentionally created
safe havens for the transfer and hiding of the illicit funds and profits of
organized crime and organized terrorists. Funds gathered within less-thanvigilant jurisdictions are funneled to terrorist cells around the world. Lax
banking regulations and poor financial oversight provide steppingstones
and networks for the financing of terrorist activity.
Prior to September 11, law enforcement worldwide had noted increased
activity by terrorist groups. They had received little governmental support
in their efforts. 40 Reading such recent works as Holy War, Inc., one has
reason to speculate that there was very little political will to encourage law
enforcement to conduct an all-out assault upon the financial networking of

36. See infra Part VIII.A.
37. George W. Bush, Address at the White House, Signing of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/
20011026-5.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
38. BERGEN, supra note 3; see also American Civil Liberties Union, How the Anti-Terrorist

Bill Limits Judicial Oversight of Telephone and Internet Surveillance, available at http://www.
aclu.org/Nationa]Security/NationalSecurity.cfin?ID-9154&c=1 I1 [hereinafterJudicialOversight]
(last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
39. History of Terrorism, availableat http://www.terrorismfiles.org/encyclopaedia/history_
of_terrorism.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
40. Martin Walker, A Brief History of Terrorism, available at http://www.eurunion.org/
magazine/0110/p26.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
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organized terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. 4' Nevertheless, who could
have ever envisioned the catastrophic acts of September 11, 2001?
The events of that day appear to have changed the earlier political
posturing. In the United States, the recognition of vulnerability to, and
threat of, future acts resulted in the Patriot Act. The Act, controversial to
be sure, nevertheless signaled support from previously silent elected and
appointed officials for the efforts of law enforcement in the transnational
arena. Governments, democratic and otherwise, have now signaled their
approval and support for an all-out assault upon the holdings of terrorist
groups. September 11, 2001, was and is a defining date not only for the
people of the United States, but also for democratic societies everywhere.
The spiraling impact of September 11 has reached and penetrated many
shores. 42 Since then, people of many nations have demonstrated a will to
deal with both the magnitude of the terrorist attacks and the threat and fear
of continuing terrorism.
Terrorists have learned their lessons from history. In the nineteenth
century, terrorists became more political, turning from the religious ideals
of twelfth century Ismailis, and to more modern ideas such as anarchism.43
Recently, in Bosnia, the terrorist threat to civilization finally got the
attention of some nations.
Terrorists have emerged and are prepared to die voluntarily; their
rewards awaiting them in the afterlife, unaware that they are sacrificing
their lives for mortals seeking territory, profit, and political power. 4 With
extensive preparation and about $532,000, the sponsors and the actors of
September 11, 2001 committed devastating acts of terror. 5
Since the conclusion of World War II, old and new democracies grew
accustomed to, and, some might argue, tolerant of, global, white collar
organized crime. However, tolerance in some arenas does not translate into

41. Id.
42. BERGEN, supra note 3; see S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4624th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 438 (2002) (condemning the terrorists attack in Bali, Indonesia).
43. The Ismailis, remembered more commonly in history by the name Assassins, "used
assassination, and the fear of it, as a political weapon." K. Gajendra Singh, Jihadis:Assassins by
Another Name, AsIA TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Middle_East/EIl2Ak01.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
44. Kurt Eichenwald, A Nation Challenged: The Money; TerrorMoney Hardto Block, N.Y.

TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2001, at Al; see also BERGEN, supra note 3.
45. Eichenwald, supra note 44, at B4; see also Comment, Responding to Terrorism:Crime,
Punishment and War, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1224 (2002).
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tolerance in others. 46 Terrorist activity impacts upon the very foundation
of the democratic state.
Government and business in the United States, as well as elsewhere,
regardless of external impressions, have a sophisticated understanding of
the workings of organized crime and its transnational components. The
same cannot be said of transnational terrorism. Religious and nationalist
fanatical fervor has not been well understood. Gathering information
regarding terrorist activity has been difficult as has sharing the information,
even between colleagues in law enforcement. September 11,2001, resulted
in, among other alterations, a modification or redirection of government
with respect to more effective law enforcement weapons, information
sharing, reevaluation of financial secrecy programs, and implementing
financial controls designed to better trace and seize the illicit money.
The reality now penetrating the political mindset is, one can only
assume, that both organized crime and organized terrorism operate in
similarly borderless environments. Each pose a threat to the stability and
security of international and national communities. Although organized
terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates profit from their illicit acts,
the acts of the terrorists pose a far greater threat to a nation's political
psyche as well as its financial markets. The threat from organized terrorists
is by far the more intense and the more complex.
Organized crime has in the past caused many nations to redesign their
laws; the privatization ofterror is accomplishing a similar purpose. Nations
have formally stated that the threat and impact of global organized crime
is a threat to national security. The same can be said of organized
terrorism. Organized crime and organized terrorism have a common thread,
common characteristics, and perhaps some similar goals. Organized
criminals and organized terrorists have at times joined together for mutual
benefit.4 7 The victim states learn from the commonalities and react
accordingly. If a distinction needs to be established between organized
crime and terrorism, it would be that organized crime's activities seem to
focus upon profit, though corruption of power must in many instances be
factored in. Organized terrorism's illicit activities ostensibly focus on
power or power sharing.
A major post September 11 financial concern is the impact upon public
confidence. Public confidence in banks, and hence financial stability, can
be,'and has been, undermined by the adverse publicity that has resulted

46. NIALL FERGUSON, CLASHING CIVILIZATIONS OR MAD MULLAHS: THE UNITED STATES
BETWEEN INFORMAL AND FORMAL EMPIRE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 121 (Stobe Talbott & Nayan

Chana eds., 2001).
47. Walker, supra note 40; see also Eichenwald, supra note 44, at Al.
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from the association, although perhaps inadvertent, of banks with
terrorists' accounts. Some financial institutions and user-friendly states are,
for the most part, unwittingly functioning as links that enable
intermediaries to transfer or deposit funds to be employed in exporting
terrorism in all of its obscene forms. Money, including terrorist money, is
attractive to financial markets. The systems are designed to make payments
and transfer funds from one complex series of accounts to another.4 8 Add
to the mix the complexity of offshore banking and correspondent accounts
operating on September 11, as well as the underground banking systems,
and the fact that half of the approximately $550 billion in U.S. currency in
existence is in the hands of foreigners, and that 90% of all $100 bills in
circulation are held in foreign hands. 49 Given these facts, one can better
understand why the tracing of terrorist money is an increasingly difficult
task requiring intense and complex management.
Through negligence and/or lack of diligence, the failure to screen out
undesirable customers results in a negative impact upon the integrity of
banks and finance officers. Some well intentioned financial systems are
undermined through unwitting association with the money managers of
organized crime or organized terrorism."
Weapons and procedures were and are available to governments who
in good faith elect to counter the threats posed by both organized crime and
terrorism. One such weapon focuses upon taking the illicit funds from the
criminal. That weapon is now being applied worldwide.
A. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Within the United States, there are numerous legal weapons available
to the government to assist in taking money from the terrorist. The goals
of the government are reflected in a recent government report, the United
States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees on
Combating Terrorism.5' This report was drafted prior to September 11 but
released on September 20, 2001. Another important document is the
Report on Intelligence Authorization FY2002.
Prior to September 11, the President had powers to act quickly. After
September 11, the President did just that by invoking, among others

48. Christopher Byron, Terrorists, Dollars and A Tangled Web: The Tentacles ofTerroristLinked Offshore Money in America (on file with the author).

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism, Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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powers, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).12
IEEPA permits the executive to identify and freeze the assets of foreign
drug lords and terrorists. It also permits the executive to apply sanctions to
those who aid and abet terrorists and other international criminals."
B. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct
Another pre-September 11, 2001 weapon was enacted into law when,
after the terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City, Congress enacted the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDP Act)." The relevant
provisions of the ATEDP Act authorize the Secretary of State to make
findings of fact, based upon war and national emergency powers, that a
targeted group is a foreign organization engaged in terrorist activity, i.e.,
activity that threatens the national security of the United States. Once
labeled and announced, all bank accounts in the United States traced to that
entity can be seized. Anyone who knowingly contributes financial support
to the named terrorist group is subject to criminal prosecution. U.S. courts
have assigned themselves a minor role;" however, they have not, to date,
willingly accepted the rubber stamp role of the clerk. 56 On March 5, 2001,
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review a somewhat similar holding in
the 9th Circuit: HumanitarianLaw Projectv. Reno."

C. IEEPA Firstto be Employed
On September 23, 2001, the President issued an executive order
blocking property exchange and prohibiting transactions with persons who
commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism. In so doing, the
President signaled his intention to declare war (used in a political not a
constitutional context) on illicit (terrorist) financial expenditures. Twentyseven entities or persons were named. The President issued the executive
order under the authority of IEEPA and the U.N. Participation Act.
The world has not been silent on this point; the Foreign Ministers of the
leading economic nations agreed on September 25, 2001, to produce a

52. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996).
53. See Eichenwald, supra note 44, at Al.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1999).
55. People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
56. NCRI v. U.S. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also In Re All Matters
Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (2002) [hereinafter
Memorandum Op.].
57. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
904 (2001).
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coordinated plan to seize the assets of terrorist groups. Japan and the
European Union, among others, have accelerated cooperation among
nation states, especially in the arena of anti-terrorist legislation with a
focus upon money laundering, banking, and other money exchange centers,
increasing supervision, arrest warrants, and surveillance.
Parochial preoccupation with national borders and national sovereignty
has begun to give way to borderless search and seizure of persons and
assets. The worldwide campaign against terrorismprompted by September
11, 2001 is defined in the President's September 23, 2001 Executive Order
13224, and implemented in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, as
well as the NATO statements of September 12 and October 1, 2001. Full
implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 requires
significant transnational countermeasures to combat organized (privatized)
terror.
D. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373
Security Council Resolution 1373 establishes binding obligations upon
the 189 U.N. member states. It focuses upon an international security threat
and a campaign to root out terrorists and terrorist assets. The language of
Resolution 1373 is mandatory. The requirement that states report back
within ninety days has resulted in many states adopting anti-terrorism acts.
For example, the USA PATRIOT Act is the direct result of Resolution
1373. Organized efforts by international agencies have increased as well.
The International Monetary Fund Communique of November 17, 2001
speaks to matters involving international security and focuses upon
implementation of Resolution 1373. The Financial Action Task Force met
in extraordinary session on October 29, 2001, and expanded its mission by
adopting eight anti-terrorism special recommendations. All international
agencies considering the issue recognized one point: the problems
presented by the present roster of terrorists are basically matters of first
impression. In adopting Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001, the U.N.
Security Council stated that the September 11, 2001 act of international
terrorism was a threat to international peace and security.5 8 This was the
first time such determination had ever been made. 59

58. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 6.
59. See U.S. Report to UNSC on Counterterrorism Measures, available at http://usinfo.
state.gov/topical/pol/terror/0 1121906.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
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VII. THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001: AN ACT TO PROVIDE THE
APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND

OBSTRUCT TERRORISM: THE FINDINGS

In order to extract financial resources from terrorist organizations, the

'

United States, among others, targets businesses, front companies,
charitable organizations, banks, and now, the underground money transfer
systems, as well as correspondent banks that potentially or in fact serve as
a major source of funding for organized crime and terrorism. What makes
the task so difficult is that some legitimate businesses and charitable
organizations unintentionally commingle funds with contributions from
terrorist front organizations. At present, simply distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate money sources is a formidable task. There is substantial
evidence demonstrating that some Islamic charitable organizations have (in
all probability) been penetrated, exploited, and controlled by terrorists
involved with al-Qaeda. 60 Islamic charitable organizations accused of
having ties to al-Qaeda include, as of this writing, multinational Persian
Gulf-based businesses that operate with multimillion dollar budgets at one
end of the spectrum, to small, tightly organized front cells at the other.6
Listed in the U.S. President's Executive Order 13224 and its annex are
Islamic charitable organizations that are accused of serving as covers for
terrorist groups, groups that adopt innocuous names and co-opt legitimate
causes. Terrorism engulfs many unsuspecting and well-intentioned
individuals who support relief efforts for refugees through various
charitable organizations. Unbeknownst to the donors, their monies may be
diverted, ultimately ending up in the coffers of al-Qaeda.
A. Enter the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001: A Response to Security
Council Resolution 1373
It is the intent of the U.S. Congress that the Act serve as a broad-brush
aid to law enforcement officials in the search for and seizure of the assets
of terrorists. The Act allots much wider statutory latitude to federal

authorities who already possess in rem forfeit powers. The Act expands
access to data and sharing of intercepted data among government agencies.
"Today, we take an essential step in defeating terrorism while protecting

60. See Eichenwald, supra note 44, at B4.
61. See generally id.; BERGEN, supra note 3.
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the constitutional rights of all Americans," said President Bush during the
signing ceremony.6 2 The two concepts, however, may be incompatible.
Implementation of programs now covered by the Act required
congressional acknowledgment of past serious problems.63 For example,
Congress has long ignored bulk cash smuggling as a threat. In United

States v. Bajakajian,"for the first time in U.S. history, the Supreme Court
held that the forfeiture of cash from bulk cash smuggling was prohibited
under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines. The
Court found that neither the meager legislation nor the U.S. Constitution

permitted an in rem forfeiture program where one of the so-called criminal
acts in question was nothing more than a failure to declare at the border
cash sums in excess of $10,000.65 The bulk cash smuggling provision of
the Act settles the matter in favor of preventing illicit bulk cash smuggling
within or without the United States. Further, the Patriot Act expands
forfeiture of assets when the assets are earmarked for terrorist
organizations (though nations will at times disagree on the use of the
designation "terrorist" to refer to some politically active organizations).
The Act also enhances the powers of the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Patriot Act
encourages closer cooperation through a policy coordinating committee
made up of representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and
State; the National Security Council; the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
and the Central Intelligence Agency. Executive Order 13224 also expands
the work of the Foreign Asset Tracking Center, as well as Operation Green
Quest. The Act also focuses upon international cooperation and due
diligence. There are provisions expanding long-arm jurisdiction over
foreign money launderers and money laundering through foreign banks.6
The Act permits a federal judge or magistrate to issue a pen register or
trap and trace order without specifying the service provider, leaving it to
the law enforcement officer to insert the service provider as necessary to

62. Memorandum Op., supra note 56; see generally EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act That Relate to Online Activities (Oct. 31, 2001), availableat http://www.eff.
org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorismmilitias/200l1031_eff usapatriotanalysis.php [hereinafter
EFFAnalysis] (last visited Aug. 20, 2003); see also S. Osher, Essay, Privacy, Computers and the
PatriotAct. The FourthAmendment Isn't Dead, but No One Will Insure It, 54 U. FLA. L. REV. 53334 (2002).
63. See USA PATRIOT Act § 371 (2001).
64. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
65. See generally Comment, Excessive Fines Clause, 112 HARV. L. REv. 152 (1998).
66. See generally EFFAnalysis, supra note 62; see also 147 CONG. REC. S10990-11060
(Oct. 25, 2001) (Senate).
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complete an investigation.6 ' The order is valid anywhere in the United
States.6' An ancillary effect of this provision is that if there are challenges
to the order, the challenge must occur in the jurisdiction where the order
was issued. With little to gain, few service providers are likely to bring

such a challenge.
A troubling provision of the Act involves the so-called "knock and
announce" prior to execution of a search warrant. The Supreme Court has
signaled its distrust of no-knock entries.69 "Knock and announce" was
established as a prerequisite to executing a search warrant, except, of
course, under exigent circumstances. In Section 213, the Act amends 18
U.S.C. § 3103(a), thus, allowing federal law enforcement to enter without
a homeowner's knowledge and to examine or copy papers and effects. The
homeowner may not be made aware of such intrusion until weeks later.
The problem is that it is not, on its face, limited to terrorists or terrorist
activity. It can also apply to drug cases, tax or tax fraud cases, or, in fact,
any federal predicate crime.
The Act permits enhanced surveillance by readopting the so-called
roving wiretap. Under the Act, a warrant need not specify a single phone
line. Any phone will suffice if the user is suspected of terrorism. The
Attorney General has argued that roving wiretaps do not violate the Fourth
Amendment because they do not eliminate the particularity requirements
for search warrants; 70 they merely substitute particularity of person for
particularity of place."
The definition of law enforcement officer is amended to include federal
law enforcement, national security, intelligence, national defense,
protective, immigration personnel, and the President or Vice President of
the United States when the issue relates to foreign intelligence. The Act
also combines relevant portions of Title II with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act for purposes of domestic surveillance.72
The Act also authorizes interception of the contents of communications
by persons deemed computer trespassers. The interceptor must first obtain
the permission of the owner or operator of the computer being unlawfully
accessed. A computer trespasser is defined as a person who is not

67.
68.
69.
70.
Nov. 12,
71.
72.
S10990,

JudicialOversight,supra note 38.
Id.; see also Osher, supra note 62.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
Tracey Maclin, On Amending the Fourth:Another Grave Threat to Liberty, NAT'L L.J.,
2001, at A20.
Id.
See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 201-06 (2001); see also CONG. REC., supra note 66, at
11005-07.
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authorized to access a protected computer and, as such, has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to communications transmitted through
the computer accessed; hence, judicial oversight is not required. There
must, however, be "reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of the
computer trespasser's communications will be relevant" 3 to a law

enforcement investigation. This section is intended to provide for
responses to cyberattacks that may be the work of organized crime or
terrorists. Section 217 of the Act also protects government from liability
for warrantless wiretaps; however, this provision does not appear to protect

from liability the service provider who has provided services or technical
assistance to the government.74
The Act expands the scope of subpoenas for records of electronic
surveillance and amends existing law to authorize a subpoena for
transactional records to determine the payment used by suspected terrorists
in order to determine identities when persons are operating under aliases."
The Act also permits, though does not require, service providers to make
emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and
limb. Thus, service providers could disclose their customers' electronic
communications or records relating to such communications such as
contents of stored mail and customer information. The provider must
reasonably believe that an emergency exists involving immediate danger
of death or serious bodily injury to any person to permit disclosure without
delay. Under preexisting law, the provider was not authorized to disclose
non-content information, such as subscriber login records.
The Act amends the statutory suppression ofthe evidence rule under the
1968 Wiretap Statute that provides that illegally intercepted wire or oral
communications cannot be used in court or in agency hearings. 76 The Act
extends the statutory exclusionary rule to electronic communications and
applies to both real time and stored communications.
B. ForeignIntelligence Surveillance Act of 1978"
The key impact of Title II is the amending of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 in a manner that reflects modern reality. Section
204 of the USA PATRIOT Act separates foreign intelligence surveillance
from the criminal procedure protections afforded to domestic wrongdoers.

73.
74.
75.
76.

USA PATRIOT Act

§ 217 (2001).

Id. §§ 201-06.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968).
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978).
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The term foreign intelligence means "information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist
activities."" The term foreign intelligence information includes
information about a U.S. citizen that concerns a foreign power or foreign
territory and information relating to "the national defense or the security
of the United States" or "the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States."7 9 Therefore, when information about a U.S. citizen's relationship
with a foreign country or its government becomes available from a
criminal investigation, that information is eligible to be disseminated
widely as "foreign intelligence information.""
Investigatory authority is expanded in Section 204 of the Act by
affirming the intelligence exceptions and disclosure of wire or oral
electronic communications. 8 ' To this point, the Act grants federal agents
expanded authority to conduct warrantless surveillance, provided that the
primary purpose of the investigation is to obtain foreign intelligence
information.8 2 The Act amends the criteria for FISA authority by "striking
'the purpose' and inserting 'a significant purpose"' 8 3 of the investigation,
meaning any relationship of the investigation to foreign intelligence is
sufficient grounds.
The Act also permits investigators to obtain, in a less complex manner,
wiretaps for activity on the Internet by expanding the previously discussed
pen register statute to include electronic communications and Internet
usage. It also allows the collection of information that is more private than
IP addresses, which are, it is argued, the Internet's equivalent of phone
numbers. Additionally, Internet service providers must make their services
more wiretap friendly, giving law enforcement the ability to capture pen
register information, or allowing the installation of Carnivore technology.
Further, Section 209 treats voice mail messages as stored data subject to
seizure under a search warrant, not a wiretap order.
One concern is that when sensitive information from the investigation
of criminal cases is disseminated to agencies with intelligence, military,
and other national security responsibilities, the risk that it will be deployed

78. 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2) (2001); see FactSheet 9: Wiretapping/Eavesdroppingon Telephone

Conversation, Utility Consumers' Action Network, Mar. 1993/Revised Aug. 2001; see Bruce
Zagaris, CounterterrorismandEconomic Sanctions, 17 INT'LENFORCEMENTLAwREP. 480(2002).
79. USA PATRIOT Act § 203 (2001).
80. Id.; see, Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2003).
81. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978).
82. Id. § 1801(c).
83. See Memorandum Op., supra note 56, at 613.
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elsewhere is multiplied. 84 The Act includes a provision that is intended to
guard against the expanded sharing of information from electronic
surveillance. If the government uses the electronic surveillance procedures
of the FISA to monitor the conversations of a person, and that information
is disclosed without proper authority, under the Act, the aggrieved person
may have an action against the federal government and recover money
damages.
As a deterrent against malicious leaks, the Act includes procedures for
administrative discipline. When a court or the appropriate agency
determines that there are serious questions about whether or not an
employee willfully disclosed information without proper authority,
disciplinary proceedings are initiated. If the agency head decides that
discipline is not warranted, he or she must notify the Inspector General
with jurisdiction over the agency and provide the reasons for the decision
not to impose discipline. This is not new- civil and criminal sanctions for
violations by individuals of improper disclosure were initially authorized
under the electronic surveillance legislation in 1968 and again in 1978.85
The Act does, however, change surveillance and intelligence gathering
procedures for all types of criminal and foreign intelligence investigations,
not just for terrorism investigations.8 6

The Act also amends 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) and § 1823(a)(7)(B).
Currently, when an application is made for an order for electronic
surveillance, it must be upon a written request to the FBI Director, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or the CIA Director. The
request must certify that the purpose of the investigation is to obtain
foreign intelligence information. The certification must be for an order
against anyone that knowingly is engaging in espionage or terrorism and
is not an agent of a foreign power. Under the old rule, the Attorney General
had to personally review the order and foreign intelligence gathering had
to be the sole or primary purpose of the investigation. Law enforcement
must constantly evaluate the investigation and the courts ultimately
determine whether this condition is met. Under the new rule, however, law
enforcement has only to certify that the information gathering is a
significant purpose of the investigation, and a judge must review it. The
provision is designed to expedite the issuance of orders for foreign

84. CONG. REC., supra note 66, at S10990-11060.

85. See generally United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
86. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1805(e) (1991).
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information gathering; nevertheless, the user-friendly provision appears to
have been misused by the FBI. 7
Another controversial provision in the Act permits law enforcement to
share information about foreign intelligence that is gathered during
criminal investigations with specified law enforcement, protective,
immigration, or national defense personnel when they are performing
official duties. Currently, under the criminal code, it is difficult for law
enforcement officials to share information (even when it is foreign
intelligence information, including information from wiretaps authorized
by the criminal code) with the intelligence community. Title II of the Act
authorizes sharing of foreign intelligence information gathered by law
enforcement in criminal investigation with those government officials who
are intimately involved in transnational terrorism investigations. This
would seem to also domesticate the CIA.
The Act lessens the government's burden by making it easier to
subpoena business records. The revised law permits a national security
letter to be issued when it is relevant to an authorized foreign
counterintelligence investigation instead of the currently required
certificate to obtain subscriber information and toll billing records of a wire
or electronic communications service. The Act eliminates the showing of
a nexus between the foreign agent and a possible violation of criminal
laws, thereby decreasing the government's burden when pursuing
investigations." In order to quell the fear of those who argue that the Act
unacceptably violates the values set forth in the U.S. Constitution, such as
right of privacy and protection against unreasonable search and seizure,
there is a partial four-year sunset provision which applies to the expanded
surveillance authorities under the FISA. However, the sunset provision is
not universal within the Act.
The Act is troubling. It alters the relationship between law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. Long before the current crisis, many agencies
worldwide argued that there was justification for expanding authority
specifically for counterintelligence to detect and prevent international
terrorism. However, the greatest departure from past recommendations is
the Act's authorization to share foreign intelligence from criminal
investigations with other federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security personnel. For example,
under Section 203 of the Act, "matters occurring before a grand jury ...
when the matters involve foreign intelligence or country intelligence or

87. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 455-74 (Little, Brown & Co.

1990).
88. See Memorandum Op., supra note 56.
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foreign intelligence information" may be disclosed to agents of the CIA,
FBI, Secret Service, IRS, and OFAC, to name just a few."' The authority
to investigate U.S. citizens in counterintelligence investigations involving

terrorism and spying activities would, most probably, not change as a result
of the Act.90
The authority to disseminate foreign intelligence from criminal
investigations, including grand juries and law enforcement wiretaps,
appears to be an invitation to expand the reach of law enforcement without
special safeguards. There is, however, a provision to maintain a degree of
judicial oversight of the dissemination of grand jury information. The
National Security Act of 1947 had Cold War safeguards, drawing a sharp
line between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. The law
which established the CIA, states that the CIA "shall have no police,
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions." 9' The
Patriot Act in Title II seems to have voided this portion of the 1947 Act.

VIII. TITLE III OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Originally intended as a separate statute amending the 1970 Bank
Secrecy Act, Title III has become the centerpiece of the USA PATRIOT
Act. 92 Title III is also known as the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001 (IMLAA). Title III
amends the Bank Secrecy Act in numerous, complex ways. In so doing,
some sections are self-executing while others, such as section 352, require
implementing regulations from the Department of the Treasury. For
example, interim rules promulgated by Treasury establish obligations not
only for banks, but also for savings associations, credit unions, brokers,
dealers, and others. The Bank Secrecy Act regulations concerning financial
institutions are amended to ensure increased and stronger due diligence by
private banking, as well as regarding correspondent accounts. Strict "know
your customer" requirements are now included. IMLAA also includes
enhanced reporting mandates, and promulgates in-house anti-money
laundering procedures. Foreign bank correspondent accounts must now

89. USA PATRIOT Act § 203 (2001).
90. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
91. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).
92. See Michael Zeldin & Edward Rial, Anti-Money Laundering, USA PatriotAct, NAT'L
L.J., May 6, 2002, at A18.
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have an identifiable ownership of foreign banks maintaining correspondent
accounts in the United States.
Covered financial institutions are subject to additional regulations. The
regulations prohibit correspondent accounts of foreign shell banks and
enhance record keeping and reasonableness standards in ensuring that
correspondent accounts are not employed by a foreign shell bank. A shell

bank is a correspondent account with no identifiable ownership report; it
is defined as a foreign bank without a physical presence in any country.
Physical presence is an actual place of business.

It is the intent of Congress as expressed in Title III that banks and other
financial institutions begin to follow "know your customer" practices with
enhanced due diligence. If any jurisdiction or financial institution in or
outside of the United States is a money laundering concern, the Secretary
of the Treasury 93 will require any domestic financial institution or agency
that opens or maintains an account, payable-through account, or
correspondent account to identify the customer who is permitted to use or

conduct transactions through the account and to obtain information about
the customer that is similar to the information obtained during the regular
course of business in a financial institution.94
IMLAA sets forth jurisdictions, institutions,95 and types of accounts and

transactions that are of primary money laundering concern and authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to acquire information regarding a suspect
from any financial institution. Some of the jurisdictional factors that are
considered include:
(1) evidence that organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or
both, have transacted business in that jurisdiction;
(2) the extent to which that jurisdiction or financial institutions operating
in that jurisdiction offer bank secrecy or special regulatory advantages to
nonresidents or non-domiciliaries of that jurisdiction;
(3) the substance and quality of administration of the bank supervisory
and counter-money laundering laws of that jurisdiction;
(4) the relationship between the volume of financial transactions
occurring in that jurisdiction and the size of the economy of the

jurisdiction;

93. See USA PATRIOT Act

§ 311 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 5318A).

94. Michelle Cottle, Eastern Union: Hawala v. the War on Terrorism, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.

15, 2001, at 24, 38-40.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (defining broadly the financial institution); see also Zeldin & Rial,
supra note 92, at A18.
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(5) the extent to which the jurisdiction is characterized as an offshore
banking or secrecy haven by credible international organizations or
multilateral expert groups;
(6) whether the United States has a mutual legal assistance treaty with that
jurisdiction, and the experience of the U.S. law enforcement and
regulatory officials in obtaining information about transactions originating
in or routed through or to such jurisdiction; and
(7) the extent to which that jurisdiction is characterized by high levels of
official or institutional corruption.96

The institutional factors considered are:
(1) the extent to which such financial institutions, transactions, or types
of accounts are used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or
through the jurisdiction;
(2) the extent to which such financial institutions, transactions, or types
of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction;
and
(3) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure, with respect to
transactions involving the jurisdiction and institutions operating in that
jurisdiction, that the purposes of this subchapter continue.9

Section 328 of the Act enlarges wire transfer provisions of the Bank
Secrecy Act. IMLAA requires that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretary of State encourage foreign governments to require the name of
the original person in wire transfer instructions sent to and from the United
States and other countries until the point of disbursement. 98
IMLAA recognizes the high degree of usefulness of adequate records
maintained by both insured depository institutions and uninsured
institutions for criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations, as well as for
intelligence or counterintelligence activities. 99 The Act mandates the
availability of these records to governmental agencies for investigative
and/or counterterrorism purposes.
Finally, bulk cash smuggling into or out of the United States is now a
criminal offense. 100 The statute provides that whoever, with intent to evade
a currency reporting requirement, knowingly conceals more than $10,000

96. USA PATRIOT Act § 311 (2001).
97. Id.
98. See USA PATRIOT Act § 314 (2001) (requiring the Secretary of Treasury to issue
regulations encouraging information sharing among financial institutions, regulators, and law
enforcement).
99. Further, Section 315 expands the list of specific unlawful activities considered to be
crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) for money laundering. Id. § 315.
100. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
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in currency or other monetary instruments in the person's possession and
transports, transfers, or attempts to transport or transfer such currency into
or out of the United States will be punished under either or both criminal
and civil statutes.' 0
IMLAA also amends the definition of "financial institution"' 2 and
"money transmitting businesses"' 03 to include informal money transfer
systems. Now, persons involved in the non-conventional financial market
are also subject to mandatory records and reporting requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act.' 04
A. Non-Conventional Exchanges
Non-conventional financial institutions include underground banking.
Underground banking systems are called, among other names, hawala or
hundi.' 0 5 Underground banking appears to be ideal for terrorists who want
to transfer funds with virtually no record of the transaction.1 06 The hawala
system discretely moves funds around the world. Terrorists often use this
age-old system because of the trust factor. The funds are moved by userfriendly hawala agents called hawaladars.1 07 Hawala emerged several
centuries ago as a way for Asian traders to avoid being robbed on their
routes.' 8 Pakistan estimates that $2.5 billion flowed into Pakistan in 2001
via hawala, as opposed to $1 billion via legitimate banks.1 09
Hawala works." 0 A person desiring to transfer money to another part of
the world simply deposits money with a hawaladar."' Then, usually in
about two or three days, the intended recipient can go to his local
hawaladar and pick up the transferred funds, minus the hawaladar's fee" 2
(a system which sounds similar to the Black Market Peso Exchange as
defined by the U.S. Custom Service in July, 1999"3). The process is

101. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 & 5372 (Supp. 2001).
102. See USA PATRIOT Act 18 U.S.C. § 328 (amending 31 U.C.S. § 5312 (a)(2)(R)).
103. Id. (amending 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A)).
104. Id. (amending 31 U.C.S. § 5312(a)(2)(R)).
105. Sapra India Bulletin Article, Underground Banking and National Security, available at
http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96feb-mar/si960308.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
106. Cottle, supra note 94, at 38-40.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Katherine Macklem, Follow the Money, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 22, 2001, at 62.
111. Id.
112. Cottle, supra note 94, at 38-40.
113. Id.; see also U.S. Department of the Treasury, FinCENAdvisory,Issue No. 9, Nov. 1997.
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quicker and cheaper than that of banks. Further, underground banking
services parts of the world where banks' services are not readily available
or do not exist." 4 The major benefit to terrorists is that the hawala system
leaves virtually no paper trail; records are often kept in code and destroyed
once the transaction is completed.' ' Hawala services function in the United
States as well, usually in communities that have a significant South Asian

population."'
Another non-conventional institution is the money transfer shop. In
addition to hawala, terrorists use other more familiar money transfer

mechanisms to distribute money worldwide." 7 Money transfer shops have
flourished in the last decades due to the large number of immigrants
desiring to send cash home."' Money transfer businesses like Western
Union and MoneyGram facilitate the transfer of funds around the world in
as little as fifteen minutes."' Western Union is the largest regulated money
transfer business, with 124,000 agencies worldwide having completed 109
million transfers in 2001.120 Those transfers amounted to over $40 billion.
No bank account or background check is required and identification is
often unnecessary unless the transfer exceeds $1,000.121 The September 11
terrorists received transfers via Western Union about a year before the
attacks.' 2 2 Before September 11, 2001, several of the terrorists used
Western Union to wire $15,000 to a person in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE).' The money transferred just days before the attacks was
apparently the unspent portion of the funds used to finance the attacks.
Western Union also has an agent in the UAE that operates out of an al
Baraka exchange storefront.1 24

114.
2001.
115.
116.
117.

Tarik M. Yousef, TerroristFinancing Mechanisms, Congressional Testimony, Nov. 14,

Cottle, supra note 94, at 38-40.
Id.
Id.
118. Heather Timmons, Western Union: Where the Money Is-In Small Bills, Bus. WK., Nov.
26, 2001, at 40.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see Richard Stevenson & Leslie Wayne, More Regulations to Thwart Money
Laundering Are Imposed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002.
121. Timmons, supra note 118, at 40.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

29

Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 8
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

72

(Vol. 16

B. Offshore Banking
Although al-Qaeda may have curtailed its use of banks to move money
throughout the world, banks continue to play an important role in the
financing of terrorism.12 ' Offshore banking centers are considered by some
to be a heaven and a haven for terrorists who are looking for a place to
store large sums of money while planning how to use it. 2 6 Some, though
certainly not all, 2 7 of the offshore banking centers have lax regulations.'"
Furthermore, some offshore centers have correspondent banking
relationships with many of the world's largest banks.1 29 These are the
conclusions of IMLAA. The Act now mandates strict regulations with
respect to correspondent banking. Nevertheless, unregulated banks can, it
would seem, still be user-friendly. This is why IMLAA focuses upon banks
licensed in user-friendly states designated: (i) non-cooperative with
international money laundering principles or, (ii) warranting special
measures due to money laundering concerns."O
It is alleged that al-Qaeda moves its money through a network of underregulated banks, and then, when the source of the money is sufficiently
disguised, it moves it into safer G-7 financial institutions."'' After the
terrorists route their money through these under-regulated systems, often
in accounts registered to shell companies or legitimate businesses, the
money appears to be clean. 3 2 Investigators report that bin Laden
maintained accounts at the discredited Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI).13 3 The United States detained one person after he
donated $2 billion to al-Qaeda. He was said to be a former director of
BCCI.3 4

&

125. David Kaplan, How a Terror Funds Attacks - and Hides Its Tracks, U.S. NEWS
WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 2001, at 20.
126. Adam Cohen, Banking on Secrecy; TerroristsOppose ScrutinyofOffshore Accounts and
So Do Many UnitedStates Bankers and Lawmakers, TIME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 73.

127. 32 U.S.C. § 5318(1)(4)(A).
128. See Cohen, supra note 126.

129. Id.
130. See Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/
nccten.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
131. William F. Wechsler, Follow the Money, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 40.
132. Id.
133.

Maeve Sheehan, Dublin Link to Heartof TerrorCashNetwork, SUNDAYTIMES (London),

Sept. 30, 2001.
134. Id.
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The question remains whether the Act will be adequate to effectively
counter money laundering and terrorism.135 The Act has now placed more

restrictions than ever before on domestic financial institutions and/or
agencies that open or maintain private bank accounts in the United States,
and for foreign international banks to do away with secrecy rights,
requiring these foreign international banks to identify each customer who
accesses the account under similar "know your customer" standards that are
used for U.S. customers of U.S. banks. In addition, the Act requires
identification and authentication of original persons in wire transactions.' 3 6
Consider that al-Qaeda wired large sums of money to terrorists'
accounts in Florida.' 3 7 The money, it is alleged, was then used to purchase
flying lessons at numerous flying schools.'13 The events simply point to the
fact that governments face many obstacles in identifying, locating, and
seizing terrorist funds. Current money laundering detection techniques have
been geared toward the detection of large sums sent regularly or
frequently.' 39 Terrorist funding, on the other hand, seems to be transmitted
in much smaller amounts and on an irregular or infrequent basis.14 1
Another major problem is that some countries' entire banking industry
4
is built on strict bank secrecy."'
While many countries in the past have
opposed stricter regulation and greater financial transparency, recent events
have caused them to recognize the impact upon world order of continued
strict bank secrecy.4 2 International cooperation has increased exponentially
since September 11, 2001."3 Some countries, however, are still reluctant
to release information about some organizations designated by the United

135. See Zagaris, supra note 78; see Report of the National Commission on Terrorism,
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism [hereinafter Report], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
136. Ottawa Communique of G-7, Feb. 9, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
themes/g8-20.htm#Debt (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
137. Daniel Klaidman & Mark Hosenball, On the Trail of the Paymaster,NEwSWEEK, Nov.
19, 2001, at 38.
138. Id.
139. Mike McNamaee, A Hard Slog for Financial "Special Forces," BUS. WK., Nov. 26,
2001, at 39.
140. Id.
141. See Wechsler, supra note 131.
142. See, e.g., Ulrika Lomas, Naming and Shaming Banks is "Useful, " Says Swiss Bankers
Association Chief, TAx-NEWS.COM., BRUSSELS, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.taxnews.com/asp/story/story.asp?storyname=6245 (last visited Oct. 9,2003); see Bruce Zagaris, FA TF
Adopts New Standardsto Combat TerroristFinancing, 17 INT'LENFORCEMENT L. RPT. 493 (2001).
143. U.S. Report, supra note 59.
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States as terrorists.' 44 The reality is that what constitutes a terrorist group
to U.S. authorities might not be so designated by the European Union or
others. The matter, nevertheless, is global in nature; the concerns are not
local, and one nation cannot successfully go against it alone.
Added to the mix is the fact that prior to September 11 the procedures
for detecting and reporting suspicious transfers did not work as effectively
as envisioned. The suspicious activity reports sent to understaffed agencies
sometimes would take a week or longer to process and in that amount of
time the money may already have been put to use.'14 If nothing else is clear,
it is understood that terrorists generally have a wealth of funding sources
to draw from in order to finance their terror.1 4 6 Thus, what is important
under IMLAA is the emergence of enhanced due diligence policies and
controls, new predicate offenses, expanded forfeiture programs, strict
controls over correspondent bank accounts, long arm jurisdiction over
foreign money launderers, and increased civil and criminal penalties.
C. Other Provisions
There are additional provisions in the Act which provoke controversy.
Title IV: Section 411 defines terrorism and Section 413 identifies
terrorist organizations in the name of national security, which permits
detention of suspected noncitizen terrorists; further, these provisions limit
judicial review.'4
Title V: In addition to requiring closer cooperation and coordination
among law enforcement as discussed previously, Section 507 permits
disclosure of educational records under the National Education Statistics
Act.'14 The purpose is to aid in the investigation and prosecution of
terrorists. Questions of privacy are not dealt with, presumably leaving the
matter to judicial review.
Title VIII: This defines the federal crime of cyberterrorism and focuses
upon terrorist attacks. Title VIII also expands upon the concept of
terrorism, terrorists, those harboring terrorists and seizure of terrorists
assets, foreign or domestic. Title VIII encourages in rem seizure of all
assets derived from, involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit
any act of domestic international terrorism against U.S. citizens or

144. Paul Shukovsky, Russians Urge FBI to Close the al Qaeda Linked Bank Account with

Chechen Connections, BULL. FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 15, 2001.
145. Cohen, supra note 126, at 68.
146. Osher, supra note 62; see Eichenwald, supra note 44, at B4.
147. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 411,413 (2001).
148. Id. § 507.
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residents, or their property. Section 806 is significant because it places
terrorists in the same category as that of organized crime.' 9
Finally, the Act reaffirms and adds to the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act of 2001,150 as well as the Crime Identification Technology
Act of 1998.'1 What is noticeably in short supply in the Act are provisions
recognizing the role of Article III of the U.S. Constitution; that is, the role
and scope of U.S. federal courts in the fight against terrorism. The Act
expands the numbers of the secret federal court which meets to approve or
disapprove warrants requested by federal law enforcement.

IX.

SELF-PRESERVATION

A society has a duty to protect its own existence. The majority in the
society have the right to follow their own moral convictions in defending
their legal, social, and economic environment from changes or assaults it
opposes. Within the United States, these principles implicate constitutional
values. For example, prejudice based upon appearance is an unacceptable,
emotion-based harm (for example, discrimination because an individual is
Arabic). This is unacceptable unless a factual basis for the prejudice
emerges (for example, if terrorism impacts domestic security). Otherwise,
prejudice will not be formalized into law, and indeed the law must
discourage its circumvention in the name of expediency. The point is,
government intrusion as well as moral conviction must, short of actual war
(and in some instances, de facto war), be tested within the context of
constitutional credentials.
It is argued that the U.S. policies established to fight terrorists stem
from a desire to protect commercial and economic interests and to ensure
market and social stability globally. At certain junctures since September
11, 2001, the goals and policies are at odds with notions of constitutional
protections. Each day terrorists become more proficient in their illicit
designs and more worldwide in scope. Just as one expects protection for
arcane systems of commerce, the new challenges and threats appear to
governmental authorities to be growing beyond constitutional and human
rights parameters.

149. Id. § 806.
150. Id. § 1016.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).
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X. PRIVACY

Privacy is a major concern. For example, computer source code is a
language that speaks and functions in similar ways to other symbol
systems. Just as other languages are combinations of letters and sounds to
be written or spoken in order to convey meaning, so too is computer source
code a construct of human engineering. The debate surrounding
government's insistence upon an encryption key (or keys) to protect
national security pits privacy versus governmental self-preservation. The
battle lines have become a synthesis of international concerns about these
borderless technologies and their impact upon matters of privacy as well
as governmental self-preservation.'
The Internet changes database privacy,'" i.e., personal data, in that it
eases access to numerous databases.1" These databases may have
previously been accessible, but only rarely; whereas now accessing
transnational databases is as easy as pushing a computer key.'" The issue
is merely a quantitative one, but when the information is a transfer of
military secrets or a matter of security interest, legal concerns will be
generated, indeed are being generated, where none were previously
warranted.156 Terrorists and the Internet have impacted constitutional
concerns about privacy. Qualitative privacy is no longer a reality.'"
Terrorism conjures up the notion that conceptions of privacy are
dependent upon society's technology. This notion has at its core the belief
that the Internet is not changing views of how privacy may be invaded, but
how it is shaping the very idea of what expectations of privacy are or have
become, especially within the context of the Act. Prior to September 11,
2001, privacy was measured by a reasonable expectation of privacy
standard.' Since the U.S. Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Miller159 held
that there is no expectation of privacy in banking records, the question of
retaining a zone of privacy around informational data remains

152. See generally Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Endangerment of Civil Liberties,
Electronic Privacy Information Center Washington (1998), available at http://www.epic.org/
security/infowar/epic-cip.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
153. Frederick Schauer, InternetPrivacyandthe Public-Private-Distinction,387 JURIMETRIcs
J. 555-56 (1998).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 558-59.
157. Id. at 559.
158. Schauer, supra note 151, at 562 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 361 (1967)).
159. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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unanswered,' 60 and, therefore, strengthens the Act's commands of Title III.
Whether an expectation of privacy exists in electronic commerce
transactions, electronic data collection, storage, and dissemination may

ultimately depend upon how technology, and the Internet in particular, has
been transformed and molded by terrorists organizations and user-friendly
states.1 6 1

XI. ROLE OF THE COURTS
As the changes in the current legislation are implemented, it remains to
be seen whether the changes will withstand constitutional challenges in the
United States or indeed whether judicial review will survive jurisdictional
challenges when based upon matters involving national security. Past
examples assist in answering these questions.

A. FISA, Challengedand Sustained
For example, the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act has been judicially challenged and sustained on several
grounds. 6 2 But it is important to note that, first and foremost, the courts
assumed jurisdiction. Those cases, along with the lower courts' analysis of
constitutional challenges and procedures, support the conclusion that if the
U.S. Supreme Court determines constitutional difficulties exist within
portions of any legislation presenting a federal constitutional issue, it will
not hesitate to rule. Even within the context of international terrorism,
courts rule.'16 Surveillance and national security as developed in the FISA
Act are good examples. Generally, U.S. courts have consistently held that

both the electronic surveillance and the physical search provisions of FISA
are valid. In cases such as UnitedStates v. UnitedStates DistrictCourt,'6
the Supreme Court has concluded in dicta, since it was a decision prior to
FISA, that foreign intelligence surveillance satisfies the constraints the
Fourth Amendment places upon surveillance conducted by the government.

160. Id. at 563.
161. Id. at 563-64.
162. See In the Matter of Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the
Physical Search of Non-Residential Premises and Personal Property, U.S:- Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, 1981 unnumbered slip op.; see DYCUS ET AL., supra note 87, at 469.
163. See United States v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) & 126 F. Supp.
2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
164. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); see also United States v.
Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The Court noted that the standard of probable cause necessary to justify
surveillance to protect national security is not necessarily the same standard

as that for general criminal warrants.
Lower courts have also addressed the argument that the need for foreign
intelligence surveillance does not justify an exception to the warrant
requirement. In United States v. Pelton,'"' the Court of Appeals held that

FISA has numerous safeguards that provide sufficient protection under the
Fourth Amendment. The court recognized that "[t]he governmental
interests in gathering foreign intelligence are of paramount importance to

national security; and may differ substantially from those presented in the
normal criminal investigation."'" However, even given these differences,
unlawful government intrusions upon personal civil liberties are prevented
by the independent judicial review mandated by FISA and the limitations
placed on the exercise of FISA powers. The courts have found that the use
of FISA against terrorist organizations has been, for the most part,
constitutional. Innovative techniques to suppress and deter terrorists are
being developed including tracking terrorists and their illicit money.
Changing technology continues to be addressed in the courts and it is not
enough to simply argue that new techniques are required for rapid response
to terrorist threats.' 67
The question remains whether the Act will be adequate to effectively
counter money laundering and terrorism.'16 The Act has placed more
restrictions than ever on domestic and foreign financial institutions and/or
agencies that open or maintain private bank accounts in the United
States.'6 9
A recent Supreme Court case, Kyllo v. United States, 7 0 although not
directly dealing with national security threats, is significant. Kyllo involves
domestic treatment of the Fourth Amendment. The Kyllo Court attempts
to reconcile law enforcement with new and complex technology. Since at
least 1967, the focus of a court has been a person's expectation of privacy
and whether society is prepared to honor that expectation as being
reasonable in nature."'7 In Kyllo the majority concluded that an advanced

165. 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied 486 U.S. 1010 (1988).
166. Id. (citing U.S. Dist. Court).
167. Dorothy Denning, Cyberterrorism, available at http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/
-denning/infosec/cyberterror.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).
168. See Zagaris, supra note 142; see also Report, supra note 135.
169. Ottawa Communique, supra note 136.
170. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
171. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 374 (1967).
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technology, such as the Agema Thermovision 210172 which is able to reveal
details of an intimate nature from without, must give way to the Fourth
Amendment demand for privacy unless the sense-enhancer device has been
in general use exploring other intimate details without physical intrusion.
If it has not been in general use, it is presumptively unreasonable. If it is in
general use, for national security purposes the Kyllo Court appears prepared
to permit domestic invasions without a warrant as well. The critical term

is national security and whether government has successfully made its case
in each individual instance. Kyllo would seem to allow "[c]ountervailing
technologies that defend against government surveillance . . . as they
improve and become more widespread, [which may] offset the privacy-

threatening effects produced by the dispersion of surveillance technology
into general use." 7 3
There is additional help in understanding just how the federal appeals
courts will respond to the USA PATRIOT Act. Consider, for example, 8
U.S.C. § 1189 which empowers the Secretary of State to designate a
foreign organization as a terrorist if the Secretary finds that the
organization is: 1) foreign; 2) engages in terroristactivity (as Congress had

defined it); and 3) threatens the security of the United States,' 74 then the
ramifications of such a designation would permit the government to,
among other things, freeze the organization's assets.'7 Should such
designation by the Secretary be subject to review by the courts? Two recent
cases illustrate the historical role the courts serve where threats to national
security are at issue.
B. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Department
of State'7 6
In Mojahedin, although the circuit court took jurisdiction, it did
recognize its inability to gauge the accuracy of the facts the Secretary of
State compiled as an evidentiary record regarding terrorist designation.'7 7
The fact is that, unlike other run-of-the-mill administrative proceedings, in
Mojahedin there was no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts
and agencies consider to be evidence, and no advance notice to the entity

172. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
173. Leading Cases, Fourth Amendment Warrantless Searches - Surveillance Technology,
115 HARv. L. REv. 346, 354 n.69 (2001).
174. 8 U.S.C.§ 1189 (2001).
175. Id. § 1 189(a)(2)(C).
176. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir.
1999); NCRI v. U.S. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
177. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 19.
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affected by the Secretary's internal deliberations."' Because the matter
involved a question of national security, the Secretary needed only to
accumulate information on the targeted terrorist organization.' 7 9
C. National Council of Resistance of Iran v.
United States Department of State' 80
In NCRI v. United States Department of State, two organizations, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (Council) and the PMO petitioned
the district court for review of the Secretary's designation of them as
terrorist organizations.' 8 ' The NCRI court determined that in this case,
unlike in the Mojahedin case, the groups designated as terrorist were
denied due process rights since they had acquired property in the United
States (in the form of a small bank account) that the NCRI court said was
placed in jeopardy by government intervention.8 2 The NCRIcourt accepted
the Secretary's conclusions that the Council was merely an alias for the
PMO and lumped these two organizations together as one before the NCRI
court set out to arbitrate a reasoning which created due process rights for

the organization.'
Before the Secretary of State designates an organization terrorist, he or
she must notify specific members of Congress by classified written
communication. The designation becomes effective seven days later.'84 The
Mojahedin court, as noted, rejected the PMO's argument that the U.S.
Constitution's Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits the
government from condemning organizations without giving them notice
and an opportunity to be heard.' It recognized that the statute's
administrative record requirement supporting the Secretary's designation
was unlike the normal run-of-the-mill administrative proceedings of U.S.
agency law.' 86 It remained for the Mojahedin court to determine what
"substantial support"' 7 the Secretary would need in order to properly
designate a group as terrorist.'"The administrative record, which a given

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
NCRI, 251 F.3d at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 199.
8 U.S.C. § 1 189(a)(2).
Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22.
Id. at 19.
8 U.S.C. § 1189 (b)(3).
Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 24; see also 8 U.S.C.
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petitioner could attack for insufficient or unsubstantiated accusations, can
have classified materials not available for public discourse or review,' 8 9 or
nothing more than news reports, Internet information, third-hand accounts
and other hearsay which have not been subjected to any type of adversarial
examination.1 90 The Mojahedin court recognized an issue of balance of
power.
Balance of power issues, such as the scope of judicial review or the
discretion accorded to the executive in taking action against suspected
foreign terrorist organizations, are sources of great concern to the courts.' 9
If a court, upon judicial review, invokes a minimal interpretation of the
statute and the requirement that the Secretary compile a record that
substantially supports the terrorist designation, such an interpretation may
leave limited room for judicial review.1 92 The argument is that if a court's
only function is to decide whether the Secretary simply had enough
information to make his or her designation, then the Secretary would have
broad and unfettered discretion in the fact-finding process, immune and
isolated from judicial scrutiny.' 93 A court would function as a mere rubber
stamp of the Secretary's actions, thereby, allowing the reputation of the
judiciary to be "borrowed by the political branches to cloak their work in
the neutral colors of judicial action."' 94
However, if courts were to take a more stringent interpretation of the
statute, it would perhaps serve as an impediment to the efficiency and
strength of the Secretary's determination. Arguably, it would undermine
the very power of the Executive Branch, creating a precedent backlog of
cases where the Secretary's findings are overturned by actively maximus
courts, resulting in the judiciary's undertaking unnecessary detective work
of suspicious executive decisions in the very sensitive political arena of
foreign terrorism (an area in which the judiciary lacks expertise). After the
events of September 11, 2001, it is unlikely that the courts will be secondguessing and engaging in critical reviews ofthe Secretary's designations.1 95

189. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 19.
190. See generally Alan Wolfe, The Home Front:AmericanSocietyResponds to the New War,
in How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR (James Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds.,

2001).
191. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2001).
192. Derek P. Jinks, International Decision: People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v.
United States Department of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 396 (2000).
193. Id. at 399.
194. Id. at 400; see also Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
195. After this date, the law will be in a process that will potentially expand it, and make it
more easy to collect, gather, and adjudicate information on potential terrorist activity.
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The Mojahedin court undertook the former minimal approach, taking
a hands-off approach with respect to the Secretary's findings.19 6 The
Mojahedin court took the sort of interpretation we will probably see much
more of in the future. The Mojahedin court stated that:
We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before
the Secretary is or is not true.. .. The record consists entirely of hearsay.
... Her conclusion might be mistaken ... something we have no way of

'

judging. 9 7
The statute was meant to give the judiciary the opportunity to analyze
terrorism in a legal context.1 98 In legal contexts, courts are used to the rules
of evidence, the procedures of administrative practice, and the
constitutional demands of due process or notice. However, the concept and
philosophy of terrorism is usually not a legal one, but a political or
religious one, rooted in desire and ideology, not necessarily money or
legality.1 99 As such, the politics and ideologies that are inherent in terrorism
are the paper trails that will lead the evidentiary way to the rule of law. The
terrorist battles are fought on diplomatic and political fronts through
treaties, and the rule of law intrudes by way ofjudicial review.20 0
Of course, the issue is not whether a terrorist organization will be
brought to justice, but rather what rights they will be afforded. The courts
will, in the final analysis, determine what organizations are entitled to the
full range of U.S. constitutional rights. It seems that foreign organizations
that have unclear mission statements, that are engaged in undermining
political schemes around the world, and that are in many ways linked to
terrorism are by their very definition unconventional; however, if domestic
links are apparent, then there is entitlement to most conventional
constitutional rights. Here, the standard of evidence relied on by the
Secretary, and eventually a reviewing court, is what is at dispute, which
includes the issue of procedural rights for foreign organization engaged in
illicit activity outside the territorial limits of the United States.20

196. Jinks, supra note 190, at 399.
197. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 25.
198. Jinks, supra note 190, at 400.
199. Id.
200. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1643, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2001).
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The PMO argued that it had been denied due process of law partly
because the Secretary's designations had the effect of making it a crime to
donate money to the organization.202 However, the Mojahedin court pointed
out that these groups did not have any U.S. ties, including ties to financial
institutions holding any of their property.203 From the facts as presented in
a non-criminal context, the PMO had no presence in the United States. 204
Thus, the Mojahedin court stated that a foreign entity without property or
presence in the United States has no constitutional rights under the due
process clause or otherwise. 20 Alien organizations are to receive
constitutional protections only when they have come within the territory of

the United States and developed substantial connections within the
country. 206 The Mojahedin court considered the rights which the PMO
enjoyed purely statutory. 207 These organizations had the right, for instance,
to seek a court's judgment about whether the Secretary followed statutory
procedures or whether she made the requisite findings, or whether she
assembled a record which substantially supported her findings. 208 However,
one of the statutory findings which the Secretary is duty bound to make is
whether the terrorist activity by the alien organization threatens the security
of the United States; that conclusion is not subject to judicial review. 209 It

202. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 19.
203. Id. at 22. "Aliens receive constitutional protections only when they have come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country."
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S.
222 (1984).
204. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
Whatever rights the LTE and the PMO enjoy in regard to these cases are statutory rights
only. Because Congress so allowed, the LTrE and the PMO are entitled to contest their
designations on the grounds set forth in § 1189(b)(3). Under the statute, they may for
instance seek our judgment about whether the Secretary followed statutory procedures, or
whether she made the requisite findings, or whether the record she assembled substantially
supports her findings.

Id.
208. Id.
209. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23; "Of the three findings mandated by § 1 189(a)(1), the third
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of the United States nationals or
the national security of the United States is non-justiciable." Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
It is beyond the judicial function for a court to review foreign policy decisions of the
Executive Branch. These are political judgments, decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibilities and have long been held to belong in the
domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
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is a political judgment reserved for the foreign policy expertise of the
executive, a judgment call beyond the aptitude, facilities, and
responsibilities of judicial inquiry.2"'
The Mojahedin court stated that courts do not have to assume whether

the Secretary was right or wrong,2 ' but only whether the Secretary had a

'

quantitively adequate record upon which to rely (the minimalist
approach).2" This ruling is rooted in the idea that the appeals courts are
designed to review judgments. 213 In the realm of administrative decisions,
courts are not to engage in the choice of deciding whether the agency
engaged in the right-result or the wrong-reason. 214 A court's function is to
remand the case back to the agency if deemed necessary to adjust its
reasoning or alter its result. 215 The Mojahedin court was content with the
minimal role that Congress intended within the national security context. 216
In order for a foreign entity to obtain constitutional protections under
due process or otherwise, that entity must have come within the territory
of the United States and developed substantial connections with the
country.2" The Mojahedin court's main task is to judge 218 whether the
Secretary had enough information upon which to rely for her designation. 219
But it is still left to the Mojahedin court to determine what substantial
connections an organization needs to have in the United States in order to
be afforded due process.2 2 This is the importance of the NCRI case.2 2
The NCRI court focused upon whether the Secretary, on the face of
things, had enough information before her to conclude that a particular
organization is terrorist.2 22 Thus, the dynamic of judicial review in the
foreign organization (civil) context is reduced to a quantitative judgment
of how much information the Secretary has relied upon rather than a

Id. at 111.
210. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23-24.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. In cases on appeal from the district court, courts are to review judgments, not
opinions. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
214. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
217. Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 22.
218. Id. at 19.
219. Id. at 25.
220. Id. at 22. "A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no
constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise." United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
221. NCRI v. U.S. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
222. Id. at 196, 199; 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b) (2001).
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qualitative judgment of what kind of information was relied upon. 223 The
NCRI court focused its rationale on aspects of designating that were not
dealt with in the Mojahedin case.22 4 The NCRI court concluded that the
Secretary's designation of the Council as an alias for the PMO was
substantially supported by the record and was neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor otherwise unlawful.225 The ramification of the NCRI court approving
the Secretary's finding that the Council was a mere cover or alias for the
PMO may have actually found more rights available than the Mojahedin
court was willing to concede. 226
Constitutional presence in the United States as found by the NCRI court
was sufficient to grant the petitioners more rights than the petitioners were
given in Mojahedin. The NCRI re-assessed the PMO's presence in the
United States by claiming that although the PMO had not established a
constitutional presence by 1997, it had established a presence by 1999,
along with a record. 227 The controversy was whether the Council had
actually developed the substantial connections228 necessary to characterize
a presence in the United States.2 2 9 The NCRI court rationalized its decision
by engaging in a review of several cases, dissecting and
compartmentalizing the legal English vernacular into critical adverbs and
nouns. 23 0 The Court's interpretations of these prior cases and its reasoning
came full circle. After having reviewed the entire record, the PMO had
sufficient presence in the United States to grant it constitutional rights.2 31
Further, because the Council was merely the PMO's alias, it also had a
right to Fifth Amendment due process. 2 2
The NCRI court ignored the fact that in dealing with foreign or alien
organizations, the United States has frequently exercised its inherent
powers of external sovereignty, independent of the grants of the U.S.
Constitution. 233 Thus, the NCRI court escaped the sovereign versus
constitutional dilemma" by noting that because neither the Council nor the

223. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 197.
226. Id at 198-99
227. Id.
228. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.
229. Id. at 201.
230. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
231. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 203.
232. Id at 204.
233. Jinks, supra note 190; see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes
Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 561 (1999).
234. NCR], 251 F.3d at 202-03.
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PMO are governments, but merely organizations, the Secretary's argument
and authority that the United States should deal with foreign organizations
through sovereign contexts instead of constitutional ones has no weight.
The USA PATRIOT Act soon to follow would seem to take issue with the
NCRI court's conclusion.2 35
The NCRI court concluded that the Secretary has given no reason not
to award a pre-deprivation due process hearing. 236 The NCRI court seemed
to take the position that national security was a question of what kind of
hearing the petitioners should get as opposed to when they should get it.?3
In the end, at least according to the Mojahedin and NCRI cases, a given
foreign organization being considered by the Executive Branch as terrorists
thus subject to civil sanctions could arguably expect the following rights: 3 8
1) If the foreign organization has some form of property interest in
the United States (perhaps a small bank account or even a closet-size
office with a telephone and chair would suffice), they are entitled to the
constitutional rights of Fifth Amendment due process which includes:
-Pre-deprivation notice of unclassified evidence pointing toward
the organization in question as "terrorist" (unless the Secretary can
prove a particular need or urgency to not give early notice).
- The opportunity to present (at least in written form) evidence
which can rebut the administrative record or negate the "terrorist"
proposition.2'
2) If the organization cannot prove some sort of property interest in
the United States, it will not be afforded Fifth Amendment due process
rights and will at best receive a post-designation notice.2 4 0

The point is that reasonable measures to protect against international
terrorism implicate all three branches: the executive, legislative, and
judicial, as well as the international community.2 4

235. Id
236. Id.
237. Id at 207. "Certainly the United States enjoys a privilege in classified information
affecting national security so strong that even a criminal defendant to whose defense such
information is relevant cannot pierce that privilege absent a specific showing ofmateriality." United
States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir 1989).
238. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 207. "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976).
239. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 205-07.
240. People's Mojahedin Org. Of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (2001); Klareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999).
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XII. CONCLUSION

Overall, the USA PATRIOT Act is designed to support law
enforcement in addressing complex issues regarding the role of money
laundering, asset forfeiture, intervention into foreign affairs, and control of
complex technology in terrorism. The Act is not intended to implement a
due process model of constitutional adjudication. It is instead a crime
control model; a model which receives its signals from modern U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The President speaks in terms of a war on
terrorism. This is, however, an undeclared war. The President suggests that
this war will require patience, determination, and resolve. Judicial review
and world-wide concerns cannot be ignored. Judicial review is
constitutionally mandated where constitutional issues emerge. Worldwide
input is reflected in the U.N. Charter, as well as Resolution 1373. The
traditional role of the U.S. federal judiciary is, in part, to focus upon law
enforcement and ensure that any attempt, even temporary, at derailing
legitimate constitutional human rights freedoms is itself considered an
affront to democratic values.2" The traditional constitutional role cannot
be eroded by fear or instant fixes. Although a society has a duty to protect
its own existence, the majority in the society have the right to follow their
own moral convictions in defending their social environment from assaults
from within or without, and to ensure that their society works successfully.
These concepts must continue to include constitutional and transnational
values. It is unacceptable to infringe upon and diminish these values unless
a tested factual basis for infringement emerges.24 3 It is not adequate enough
to simply formalize into law alterations to human rights values through
speeches to user-friendly audiences. Governmental intrusion must be tested
within the context of compelling credentials.

242. See Fletcher Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check of
Institutional Misdirection, 45 IND. L.J. 550 (1970); see also Zagaris, supra note 142, at 526;

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
243. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
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